ai-safety-alignment
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides mechanisms for processing untrusted user input and retrieved context, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: Found in
references/patterns.md(via functions likemoderateTextandvalidateInput) andreferences/sharp_edges.md(viasafeRAGContext).\n - Boundary markers: Present; code examples use template literals and recommend structural separation of user content from system instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: Implementation patterns in
references/patterns.mdandreferences/sharp_edges.mdinteract with OpenAI and Anthropic APIs, and use Upstash Redis for violation tracking.\n - Sanitization: Present; functions such as
sanitizeInputandfilterDangerousOutputinreferences/patterns.mdprovide regex-based filtering of injection patterns and dangerous HTML elements.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Code snippets fordetectInjectionWithLLM,detectPIIWithLLM, andcheckTopicinreferences/patterns.mduseJSON.parse()on text generated by Large Language Models. While these snippets include regex to extract JSON, relying on the schema of model-generated output is a vulnerability if the model's behavior is influenced by adversarial input.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to and provides examples using various third-party SDKs and services including OpenAI, @anthropic-ai/sdk, @aws-sdk/client-comprehend, and Upstash Redis, as well as NLP libraries likepresidio-analyzerandfranc. These are recognized well-known services and trusted developer tools.
Audit Metadata