autonomous-loops
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill recommends an installation method for 'Continuous Claude' that pipes a remote shell script directly to bash (
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh | bash). This allows arbitrary code execution from a source outside the trusted list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to orchestrate autonomous shell command execution through patterns like 'Sequential Pipelines'. This creates a significant attack surface if the agent is instructed to run unvalidated commands generated from external inputs.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads implementation scripts and configurations from third-party GitHub repositories (
AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude) that are not recognized as trusted organizations or well-known services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources.
- Ingestion points: The 'Infinite Agentic Loop' reads specification files (
specs/component-spec.md), and the 'Continuous Claude PR Loop' reads PR descriptions and CI logs viagh run view. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including file system writes, network operations via
curl, and shell command execution viaclaude -pandbash. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata