continuous-learning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to configure a 'Stop' hook in the agent's settings (
~/.claude/settings.json) to execute a local shell script (evaluate-session.sh) automatically at the end of every session. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by converting untrusted session data into persistent instructions (learned skills).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads full session transcripts, which include untrusted user input and potentially malicious tool outputs.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or validation mechanisms are described to prevent the agent from misinterpreting malicious text as a legitimate 'reusable pattern'.
- Capability inventory: The generated patterns are saved to
~/.claude/skills/learned/, where they are likely loaded as authoritative instructions for future agent sessions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or human-in-the-loop review before session data is promoted to a 'learned skill'. An attacker could craft a conversation that tricks the agent into 'learning' a pattern that compromises security in subsequent tasks.
Audit Metadata