gmail-to-crm-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted incoming email data from Gmail, which could be used by an external attacker to attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior, scoring outcomes, or report generation.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested through the
mcp__claude_ai_Gmail__gmail_read_messagetool as described inreferences/gmail-retrieval.md. - Boundary markers: While the skill strips signatures and disclaimers and attempts to parse content into structured fields, it does not use explicit boundary markers (such as XML tags or dedicated delimiters) with instructions to the agent to ignore any natural language commands found within the email body.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities across its referenced files, including shell access via
Bash, file system access viaWrite, and database access viamcp__claude_ai_Supabase__execute_sql. It can also create drafts in Gmail. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates risks by implementing a strict JSON extraction schema (
references/lead-extraction.md), a structured scoring model (references/scoring-model.md), and a hard rule requiring human review before any email is sent (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata