sub-agent-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill orchestrates pipelines where agent prompts are constructed by interpolating outputs from previous steps (e.g.,
{{steps.research.output}}inreferences/examples.md). This creates an attack surface where a sub-agent interacting with external data, such as web search results, could pass malicious instructions to downstream agents. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
inputsand theoutputof preceding workflow steps, as defined inreferences/workflow-schema.mdandreferences/execution-engine.md. - Boundary markers: The templates provided in
references/examples.mdinterpolate variable data directly into prompts without explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator grants sub-agents access to high-privilege tools including
Bash,Write, andAgent. - Sanitization: The
references/execution-engine.mddescribes validation for schema, rules, and types, but does not specify sanitization or escaping of content to prevent prompt injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator supports generating and running workflows derived from natural language descriptions. According to
SKILL.md, while the system is designed to show the generated YAML for user approval before execution, this pattern relies on the user's ability to verify the safety of the complex execution DAG and agent prompts at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Bashtool is enabled and utilized by agents in example workflows (e.g.,researcherandintent_scorerinreferences/examples.md). The execution engine resolves variable templates directly into these agent prompts, creating a potential path for command injection if the inputs or intermediate outputs are not strictly validated before being processed in a shell environment.
Audit Metadata