skills/onipinaka/how-to/prd-creator/Gen Agent Trust Hub

prd-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it transforms untrusted user-supplied app ideas into detailed documents and has instructions to save these files to the local workspace.
  • Ingestion points: The agent takes app concepts or feature lists provided by the user as input for the PRD generation workflow in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to tell the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the user's input.
  • Capability inventory: The skill mandates that the agent save the output to the workspace (e.g., docs/PRD.md) as specified in the quality mandates section of SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not define any validation or escaping mechanisms for user-provided data before it is incorporated into the generated documents.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README.md suggests an installation method that fetches the skill from a remote repository (onipinaka/howto-skills) using a command-line tool. This is documented as a vendor-provided distribution mechanism.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md (Mandate 4) direct the agent to perform file system operations, specifically writing markdown files to the project workspace (e.g., PRD_[ProductName]_v1.md), which is the core functionality of the skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 08:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — prd-creator