prd-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it transforms untrusted user-supplied app ideas into detailed documents and has instructions to save these files to the local workspace.
- Ingestion points: The agent takes app concepts or feature lists provided by the user as input for the PRD generation workflow in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to tell the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the user's input.
- Capability inventory: The skill mandates that the agent save the output to the workspace (e.g.,
docs/PRD.md) as specified in the quality mandates section ofSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill does not define any validation or escaping mechanisms for user-provided data before it is incorporated into the generated documents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
README.mdsuggests an installation method that fetches the skill from a remote repository (onipinaka/howto-skills) using a command-line tool. This is documented as a vendor-provided distribution mechanism. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Mandate 4) direct the agent to perform file system operations, specifically writing markdown files to the project workspace (e.g.,PRD_[ProductName]_v1.md), which is the core functionality of the skill.
Audit Metadata