skills/onmax/skills/fleet/Gen Agent Trust Hub

fleet

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The bootstrap-node.sh script downloads the official Tailscale installation script and pipes it directly to the shell (curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The bootstrap process clones the author's onmax/skills repository and executes local scripts, such as sync-remote-skills.sh, which are not included in the primary skill payload.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses sudo to perform high-privilege system operations, including managing user accounts (useradd, usermod), creating groups, and installing global packages via apt and npm (@openai/codex).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script modifies system-wide firewall settings (ufw) to restrict public SSH access and allow traffic on the Tailscale network interface.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches GPG keys and repository configuration from well-known services, including Docker and the GitHub CLI, to configure system package managers.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The bootstrap script propagates access by copying the administrator's authorized_keys file to newly created agent user profiles.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The load-sharing architecture described in REFERENCE.md involves worker nodes receiving 'tasks' and 'verification commands' from a coordinator. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a compromised coordinator could send malicious instructions to be executed by worker nodes.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://tailscale.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 25, 2026, 12:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — fleet