fleet
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
bootstrap-node.shscript downloads the official Tailscale installation script and pipes it directly to the shell (curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The bootstrap process clones the author's
onmax/skillsrepository and executes local scripts, such assync-remote-skills.sh, which are not included in the primary skill payload. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
sudoto perform high-privilege system operations, including managing user accounts (useradd,usermod), creating groups, and installing global packages viaaptandnpm(@openai/codex). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script modifies system-wide firewall settings (
ufw) to restrict public SSH access and allow traffic on the Tailscale network interface. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches GPG keys and repository configuration from well-known services, including Docker and the GitHub CLI, to configure system package managers.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The bootstrap script propagates access by copying the administrator's
authorized_keysfile to newly created agent user profiles. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The load-sharing architecture described in
REFERENCE.mdinvolves worker nodes receiving 'tasks' and 'verification commands' from a coordinator. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a compromised coordinator could send malicious instructions to be executed by worker nodes.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://tailscale.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata