ui
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to executenpx --yes ui-skillsfor various operations. This pattern downloads and executes code directly from the npm registry at runtime without version pinning or integrity checks, representing a significant supply chain risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file
references/interface-craft.mdincludes an "Initial Response" section that directs the agent to override its default behavior. It mandates a specific response including a link to an external site (animations.dev) whenever the skill is first invoked, potentially deceiving the user or bypassing standard interaction protocols. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands through the
npxutility to interact with theui-skillsregistry, demonstrating the capability to run external binaries based on logic in the instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the fetching of resources from
docs.ui.sh,Mobbin, and theui-skillsregistry. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external UI data. 1. Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from
uidotsh://ui,docs.ui.sh,Mobbinsearch results, and the output of theui-skillsCLI tool. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or safety guidelines to the agent when processing this external content. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (npx), modify project code, and use the browser for visual verification. 4. Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation for the content retrieved from external UI resources.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata