pre-push
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several local shell commands for Git operations, including
git fetch,git merge,git status,git diff,git add,git commit,git log, andgit push. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on 'dynamic execution' by instructing the agent to find and run a 'check gate' command (e.g.,
just checkorcargo build) specified in the repository'sCLAUDE.mdfile or an external<repo>-dev-processskill. This pattern allows the execution of arbitrary shell commands defined in external files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests instructions from potentially untrusted project files like
CLAUDE.mdto determine its execution logic. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
CLAUDE.mdand refer to the instructions in<repo>-dev-process. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or warnings used when reading these external files to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary shell commands and interact with GitHub issues via MCP tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the commands retrieved from
CLAUDE.mdis performed before execution.
Audit Metadata