watch-video
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/watch.pyusessubprocess.runto execute shell commands (yt-dlp,ffmpeg,ffprobe). While the arguments are passed as a list (which is generally safer), theurlparameter is directly incorporated into the command line foryt-dlp. - Evidence:
_run(["yt-dlp", "-f", "mp4/best", ..., url])inscripts/watch.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download video files and metadata from a wide range of external domains (YouTube, Instagram, X, Vimeo, etc.) using
yt-dlp. This involves significant network activity and interaction with untrusted remote servers. - Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdto pass arbitrary video URLs to thewatch.pyscript. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (video transcripts and subtitles) and presents them to the AI agent for analysis. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions could be hidden in the subtitles of a processed video to influence the agent's behavior during the 'breakdown' phase.
- Ingestion points:
transcript.txtandindex.jsongenerated from external sources inscripts/watch.py. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file read/write operations and subprocess execution.
- Sanitization: The script performs basic SRT cleaning (removing HTML-like tags) but does not sanitize the text for potentially malicious natural language instructions.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates provided to the agent in
SKILL.md.
Audit Metadata