guizang-page-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/gz-fonts.mjsfetches font files from the official Google Fonts repository on GitHub (raw.githubusercontent.com/google/fonts/). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/render.mjsscript utilizesexecFileSyncto run the localscripts/gz-theme.mjsutility for processing brand-specific color themes. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/export.mjsscript launches a headless browser instance using Puppeteer with the--no-sandboxand--allow-file-access-from-filesflags. These settings bypass standard browser security boundaries, which can be exploited to read local files if the browser is directed to load malicious or untrusted content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The rendering logic in
scripts/render.mjsprocesses annotations (intended to be generated by an AI agent) and injects raw SVG and HTML content into the final document without sanitization. This creates a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability surface. - Ingestion points:
scripts/render.mjsreads the input Markdown file and anannotations.jsonfile. - Boundary markers: Absent for the
embedcomponent'ssvgandhtmlfields inrender.mjs. - Capability inventory: File system writes via
writeFileSync, subprocess execution viaexecFileSync, and browser-based rendering/export viapuppeteer-core. - Sanitization: Partial; while text labels are escaped using
escHtml, thesvgandhtmlfields inannotations.jsonare interpolated directly into the output.
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