guizang-page-skill

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script scripts/gz-fonts.mjs fetches font files from the official Google Fonts repository on GitHub (raw.githubusercontent.com/google/fonts/).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/render.mjs script utilizes execFileSync to run the local scripts/gz-theme.mjs utility for processing brand-specific color themes.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/export.mjs script launches a headless browser instance using Puppeteer with the --no-sandbox and --allow-file-access-from-files flags. These settings bypass standard browser security boundaries, which can be exploited to read local files if the browser is directed to load malicious or untrusted content.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The rendering logic in scripts/render.mjs processes annotations (intended to be generated by an AI agent) and injects raw SVG and HTML content into the final document without sanitization. This creates a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/render.mjs reads the input Markdown file and an annotations.json file.
  • Boundary markers: Absent for the embed component's svg and html fields in render.mjs.
  • Capability inventory: File system writes via writeFileSync, subprocess execution via execFileSync, and browser-based rendering/export via puppeteer-core.
  • Sanitization: Partial; while text labels are escaped using escHtml, the svg and html fields in annotations.json are interpolated directly into the output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 31, 2026, 02:11 PM