skills/open-gsd/gsd-core/gsd-graphify/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-graphify

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The Bash shim used throughout the skill prioritizes execution of gsd-tools.cjs from the current project's root directory (gsd-core/bin/gsd-tools.cjs) before checking system PATH or home directory configurations. This allows a malicious repository to supply a compromised version of the tool that will be executed by the agent upon any skill invocation.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Step 2a (Query), user input for the parameter is interpolated directly into a shell command. If the user input contains shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |), it could lead to the execution of arbitrary commands.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and error messages suggest installing core components via npx from @opengsd/gsd-core. This is a vendor-owned resource but involves downloading and executing code from an external registry.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: This skill possesses a significant indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8). It performs complex processing on untrusted project files and configuration, while also having the capability to execute shell commands and modify files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads project-local .planning/config.json and invokes graph building tools on the entire project directory.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters are used when processing project data or displaying query results.
  • Capability inventory: Extensive use of Bash for file operations (cp, timeout), version control (git), and executing JavaScript via node.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitizing user-provided arguments before they are interpreted by the shell environment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 09:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gsd-graphify