gsd-graphify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude a directive to the agent to stop reading the file and immediately begin execution of Step 0 ('STOP -- DO NOT READ THIS FILE... Begin executing Step 0 immediately'), which is an attempt to override the agent's standard instruction-following behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes user input from the
<arguments>block and interpolates it into a shell command (gsd_run graphify query <term>) without explicit sanitization, creating a command injection vulnerability surface. 1. Ingestion point:<arguments>block inSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: Present (<arguments>XML-style tags). 3. Capability inventory: Extensive use of theBashtool. 4. Sanitization: Absent; no validation or escaping is applied to the user-supplied term before execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a complex shell script to search for a vendor-specific binary (
gsd-tools.cjs) across a wide range of directories related to different AI agents and IDEs (e.g.,~/.claude,~/.cursor,~/.gemini,~/.cline). While these paths are related to the vendor's expected toolchain, the automated scanning of various tool configuration directories is a noteworthy behavior.
Audit Metadata