gsd-import
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell script that searches for a local utility (
gsd-tools.cjs) in multiple platform-specific configuration directories (e.g., .claude, .cursor, .gemini, .cline) and executes it vianode. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: If local tools are not found, the skill instructs the user to download the vendor's package using
npx -y @opengsd/gsd-core@latest. This refers to an official package belonging to the skill's author context ('open-gsd'). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as its primary function is to ingest and process external plan files.
- Ingestion points: External plan files specified by the
--fromargument enter the agent's context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to treat the imported file content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Write,Edit,Bash, andAgent, which could be exploited by instructions hidden in imported files. - Sanitization: There is no mechanism described for sanitizing or validating the content of external plan files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata