gsd-import
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a shell script that searches for a specific file (
gsd-tools.cjs) across numerous potential installation directories (including~/.claude,~/.hermes,~/.cursor, and others) and executes it usingnode. This runtime discovery and execution of local scripts at computed paths is a dynamic execution pattern. - Evidence: Found in the
<process>block ofSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to append user-supplied arguments (such as a directory path) to a shell command (
gsd_run from-gsd2). This creates a risk of command injection if the agent fails to properly sanitize the user-provided input before execution. - Evidence: The instruction "append
--path <dir>if provided" inSKILL.mdcombined with the shell execution block. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external plan files via the
--fromargument. This is an untrusted data ingestion point where malicious instructions could be embedded to influence the agent. - Ingestion points: The
--from <filepath>argument allows reading external files into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not specify using delimiters or warnings for the imported content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Edit, andAgenttools, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external file content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata