skills/open-gsd/gsd-core/gsd-import/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-import

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell script that searches for a local utility (gsd-tools.cjs) in multiple platform-specific configuration directories (e.g., .claude, .cursor, .gemini, .cline) and executes it via node.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: If local tools are not found, the skill instructs the user to download the vendor's package using npx -y @opengsd/gsd-core@latest. This refers to an official package belonging to the skill's author context ('open-gsd').
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as its primary function is to ingest and process external plan files.
  • Ingestion points: External plan files specified by the --from argument enter the agent's context (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to treat the imported file content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Write, Edit, Bash, and Agent, which could be exploited by instructions hidden in imported files.
  • Sanitization: There is no mechanism described for sanitizing or validating the content of external plan files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 09:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gsd-import