gsd-mempalace-capture
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill begins with a directive ("STOP -- DO NOT READ THIS FILE") that attempts to override the agent's normal processing flow by claiming the prompt was "injected" and instructing the agent to jump directly to later steps.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform file operations and run themempalaceCLI tool. It builds shell commands by interpolating variables such as<artifact-path>,<room>, and<wing>into commands likecp "<artifact-path>" "$ROOM_DIR/<basename>". This pattern presents a potential command injection surface if the agent does not strictly sanitize the values of these placeholders. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several documentation URLs hosted at
mempalaceofficial.com. These are informational references to a third-party site and do not involve the automated download or execution of external code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting external data without sufficient controls.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project artifacts including
CONTEXT.md,PLAN.md, andSUMMARY.mdin Step 2. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are provided to prevent the agent from obeying instructions that might be embedded within these processed artifacts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Bashtool for file system manipulation and CLI execution, and theReadtool for accessing local files. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is defined for the content read from external artifacts before it is used in subsequent operations.
Audit Metadata