gsd-mempalace-recall
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a block of text designed to override agent behavior: 'STOP -- DO NOT READ THIS FILE. You are already reading it. This prompt was injected into your context...'. This mimics adversarial injection techniques used to bypass standard instruction processing.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill aggregates data from external sources and writes it to a file for later consumption by a planner agent.
- Ingestion points: Phase
CONTEXT.mdand output from themempalaceCLI/MCP tools. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or file writing steps.
- Capability inventory:
Bash(command execution),Write(file system modification),Read, andGreptools. - Sanitization: The skill distills retrieved data into patterns and decisions but lacks explicit sanitization or escaping of the external content before it is written to the phase directory.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute vendor-specific CLI utilities (mempalace wake-up,mempalace search) to perform memory retrieval operations.
Audit Metadata