gsd-mvp-phase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interpolates raw user input via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into the agent's prompt context within the<arguments>block. While the skill instructions attempt to frame this as data rather than instructions, a malicious user could provide text designed to override the agent's objective or bypass the intended workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an ingestion point for untrusted user data that is persisted to the filesystem, creating a potential injection surface for downstream tools that read the roadmap.
- Ingestion points: User input provided via
$ARGUMENTS(phase number) and interactive responses via theAskUserQuestiontool (user stories). - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags (
<arguments>,<objective>,<process>) to attempt to delimit user data from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Write, andBashtools, allowing it to modify the local filesystem and execute shell commands based on the planning output. - Sanitization: The instruction references "user-story format validation" and "phase existence" gates within the external workflow file, though the specific implementation of this sanitization is not visible in the SKILL.md file itself.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform operations and delegates execution to other commands (e.g.,/gsd plan-phase). This creates a path where user-influenced data (like the phase number or story content) could potentially influence command-line arguments if not strictly validated by the underlying workflow scripts.
Audit Metadata