skills/open-gsd/gsd-core/gsd-phase/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-phase

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the $ARGUMENTS variable and passes it directly to internal workflows for processing. This creates a vulnerability surface where a user could provide a crafted phase description intended to manipulate the agent's behavior when it uses sensitive tools like Bash or Write.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (via $ARGUMENTS interpolation into workflow calls).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the user input as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash and Write tools, which allow for significant system and file modifications.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before the arguments are passed to the sub-workflows.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically incorporates instruction sets from external Markdown files located at ~/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/. While these appear to be vendor-specific configuration files, the pattern of loading execution logic from external paths represents a dynamic loading mechanism that could be abused if the file system is compromised.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 07:49 PM