gsd-phase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable and passes it directly to internal workflows for processing. This creates a vulnerability surface where a user could provide a crafted phase description intended to manipulate the agent's behavior when it uses sensitive tools like Bash or Write. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(via$ARGUMENTSinterpolation into workflow calls). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the user input as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
BashandWritetools, which allow for significant system and file modifications. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before the arguments are passed to the sub-workflows.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically incorporates instruction sets from external Markdown files located at
~/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/. While these appear to be vendor-specific configuration files, the pattern of loading execution logic from external paths represents a dynamic loading mechanism that could be abused if the file system is compromised.
Audit Metadata