skills/open-gsd/gsd-core/gsd-progress/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-progress

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation includes instructions to override safety protocols. Specifically, it mentions that the --force flag can be used to bypass safety gates during workflow execution.
  • Evidence: The <flags> section states that "--next --force bypasses safety gates."
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The --do flag allows for freeform natural language input which is then used to determine and execute system actions. This presents a risk where untrusted data could be used to manipulate the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The natural language string passed to the --do argument.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are defined to separate user intent from the agent's operational logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools such as Bash and SlashCommand to perform its tasks.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to sanitize or validate the freeform intent before it is processed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a $ARGUMENTS variable to capture and forward command-line inputs to other workflows, which may involve executing shell commands.
  • Evidence: The <process> block describes parsing arguments and executing specific sub-workflows.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instruction to bypass safety gates serves as a mechanism to remove operational constraints, effectively granting the agent the ability to perform actions that would otherwise be blocked by its safety layer.
  • Evidence: The --force flag description explicitly states its purpose is to bypass safety gates.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 07:49 PM