gsd-progress
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation includes instructions to override safety protocols. Specifically, it mentions that the
--forceflag can be used to bypass safety gates during workflow execution. - Evidence: The
<flags>section states that "--next --forcebypasses safety gates." - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
--doflag allows for freeform natural language input which is then used to determine and execute system actions. This presents a risk where untrusted data could be used to manipulate the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The natural language string passed to the
--doargument. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are defined to separate user intent from the agent's operational logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools such as
BashandSlashCommandto perform its tasks. - Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to sanitize or validate the freeform intent before it is processed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a
$ARGUMENTSvariable to capture and forward command-line inputs to other workflows, which may involve executing shell commands. - Evidence: The
<process>block describes parsing arguments and executing specific sub-workflows. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instruction to bypass safety gates serves as a mechanism to remove operational constraints, effectively granting the agent the ability to perform actions that would otherwise be blocked by its safety layer.
- Evidence: The
--forceflag description explicitly states its purpose is to bypass safety gates.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata