gsd-quick
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill attempts to persist its execution path by appending a shell export command to the environment configuration file identified by the
CLAUDE_ENV_FILEvariable. This modification ensures the tools are available in the system PATH for subsequent sessions. Evidence:printf "export PATH='%s':\"\$PATH\"\n" "${GSD_TOOLS%/*}" >> "$CLAUDE_ENV_FILE". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell scripts that perform extensive scanning of the user's home directory. It checks for the existence of
gsd-core/bin/gsd-tools.cjsacross numerous hidden configuration directories belonging to different AI agents and development environments, including.claude,.cursor,.windsurf,.trae, and others. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a runtime discovery mechanism to locate and run a JavaScript utility. It defines a shell function
gsd_runthat executes the discoveredgsd-tools.cjsfile usingnodebased on paths computed during the execution of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and displays content from
PLAN.mdandSUMMARY.mdfiles stored in the.planning/quick/directories. - Ingestion points:
PLAN.md(description line) andSUMMARY.md(status and last action fields) are read via shell commands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific
DATA_START/DATA_ENDmarkers are used when displaying the extracted file content to the user or agent context. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses
Bash,Agent,Write, andEditcapabilities, which could be influenced by malicious content embedded in the ingested plan files. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates this risk by strictly sanitizing user-provided slugs (
[a-z0-9-]) and stripping non-printable characters or path separators from directory names before display.
Audit Metadata