gsd-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to invoke multiple external AI command-line interfaces, includingclaude,codex,opencode,qwen,cursor, andantigravity(oragy). This involves executing third-party binaries that must be present on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions specify that the output from these external AI CLIs (collected in
REVIEWS.md) is designed to be fed back into the agent's planning process via the/gsd-plan-phase --reviewscommand. This creates a vector where instructions or adversarial content returned by an external service could influence the agent's subsequent planning and execution. - Ingestion points: External CLI responses collected from standard output and written to
REVIEWS.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None specified to distinguish external AI feedback from trusted internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write,Bash,Glob, andGreptools, providing a broad set of capabilities for the agent to act upon potentially untrusted feedback. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content received from the external AI services before it is used in the planning workflow.
Audit Metadata