skills/open-gsd/gsd-core/gsd-review/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-review

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to invoke multiple external AI command-line interfaces, including claude, codex, opencode, qwen, cursor, and antigravity (or agy). This involves executing third-party binaries that must be present on the host system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions specify that the output from these external AI CLIs (collected in REVIEWS.md) is designed to be fed back into the agent's planning process via the /gsd-plan-phase --reviews command. This creates a vector where instructions or adversarial content returned by an external service could influence the agent's subsequent planning and execution.
  • Ingestion points: External CLI responses collected from standard output and written to REVIEWS.md (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None specified to distinguish external AI feedback from trusted internal instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Read, Write, Bash, Glob, and Grep tools, providing a broad set of capabilities for the agent to act upon potentially untrusted feedback.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content received from the external AI services before it is used in the planning workflow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 07:49 PM