gsd-ultraplan-phase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user input through the
$ARGUMENTSvariable, which is processed by theultraplan-phaseworkflow. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted input could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
$ARGUMENTSfield inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present in the skill definition to isolate user arguments from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use
Bash,Read,Glob, andGreptools to execute its workflow. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or sanitization is present in the skill instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to offload data to the ultraplan cloud infrastructure associated with the claude.ai service. This involves transmitting local repository context to a remote service for processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local workflow (
~/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/ultraplan-phase.md) that utilizes theBashtool to coordinate between the local environment and the remote cloud session.
Audit Metadata