gsd-undo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external phase manifests while possessing command execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the phase manifests and reference files located in
~/.claude/gsd-core/(read via theReadtool). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the contents of these manifest files.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use the
Bashtool to execute git commands and theReadtool to access files (defined inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the manifest content is described, although the skill's objective mentions a 'confirmation gate' to review actions before execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform destructive git operations (revert). This is the intended primary purpose of the skill to manage repository state. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Accesses internal configuration and workflow files within the
~/.claude/gsd-core/directory. These are vendor-specific resources used to facilitate the rollback process and do not appear to contain sensitive user credentials.
Audit Metadata