skills/open-gsd/gsd-core/gsd-undo/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gsd-undo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external phase manifests while possessing command execution capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the phase manifests and reference files located in ~/.claude/gsd-core/ (read via the Read tool).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the contents of these manifest files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use the Bash tool to execute git commands and the Read tool to access files (defined in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the manifest content is described, although the skill's objective mentions a 'confirmation gate' to review actions before execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform destructive git operations (revert). This is the intended primary purpose of the skill to manage repository state.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Accesses internal configuration and workflow files within the ~/.claude/gsd-core/ directory. These are vendor-specific resources used to facilitate the rollback process and do not appear to contain sensitive user credentials.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 09:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gsd-undo