gsd-path-build
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several components execute shell commands derived from project configuration files or input arguments.
loop_run.pyexecutes arbitrary shell commands defined in theLOOP.mdspecification file under theverify,trigger, andskip_whenfields.dispatch_driver.pyexecutes a user-suppliedchild-commandto spawn sub-agents for coding and review tasks.scripts/_common.pyand other scripts extensively usesubprocess.runto interact with the Git CLI and local environment.- [DATA_EXFILDTRATION]: The
jev_review.pyscript performs network requests to an external service. - It sends criterion and evidence text to
https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemonefor optional evidence screening. While intended for its stated purpose and using environment-provided API keys, this involves sending repository-derived data to a non-whitelisted third-party domain. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill maintains a large attack surface for indirect injection via project metadata.
- It processes untrusted data from files like
PLAN.md,INTENT.md, andLOOP.md(ingestion points inSKILL.md,workflow_run.py). - These files can contain shell commands that are subsequently executed by the orchestrator (capability inventory in
loop_run.pyanddispatch_driver.py). - There is no evidence of command sanitization or filtering for these configuration-defined commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic loading and argument assembly at runtime.
path_config.pyusesimportlib.import_moduleto load sibling helper scripts.model_policy.pydynamically assembles CLI argument arrays based on advertised host capabilities and project policies.
Audit Metadata