gsd-path-build

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several components execute shell commands derived from project configuration files or input arguments.
  • loop_run.py executes arbitrary shell commands defined in the LOOP.md specification file under the verify, trigger, and skip_when fields.
  • dispatch_driver.py executes a user-supplied child-command to spawn sub-agents for coding and review tasks.
  • scripts/_common.py and other scripts extensively use subprocess.run to interact with the Git CLI and local environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILDTRATION]: The jev_review.py script performs network requests to an external service.
  • It sends criterion and evidence text to https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone for optional evidence screening. While intended for its stated purpose and using environment-provided API keys, this involves sending repository-derived data to a non-whitelisted third-party domain.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill maintains a large attack surface for indirect injection via project metadata.
  • It processes untrusted data from files like PLAN.md, INTENT.md, and LOOP.md (ingestion points in SKILL.md, workflow_run.py).
  • These files can contain shell commands that are subsequently executed by the orchestrator (capability inventory in loop_run.py and dispatch_driver.py).
  • There is no evidence of command sanitization or filtering for these configuration-defined commands.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic loading and argument assembly at runtime.
  • path_config.py uses importlib.import_module to load sibling helper scripts.
  • model_policy.py dynamically assembles CLI argument arrays based on advertised host capabilities and project policies.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 04:40 PM