gsd-path-define
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runandPopenacross multiple scripts (such asscripts/_common.py,scripts/pipeline_git.py, andscripts/detect_project.py) to executegitandgh(GitHub CLI) commands for version control and integration tasks.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:scripts/loop_run.pyincludes a shell execution function that runs commands specified in a localLOOP.mdconfiguration file to automate verification loops.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:scripts/path_config.pyusesimportlib.import_moduleto load internal sibling modules, which is a standard pattern for modular script organization within the framework.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:scripts/isolation.pyprogrammatically modifies configuration files for AI tools like Claude, Cursor, and Codex (e.g.,.claude/settings.json) to install 'guard' hooks that execute a local Python script upon tool usage.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's 'Supplied-spec mode' creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting natural language instructions from user-provided project specifications like PRDs or issue descriptions.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via specification files described in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly use delimiters to wrap external document content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege automation capabilities including arbitrary git command execution and filesystem modification across all bundled scripts.\n
- Sanitization: The scripts perform extensive structural and regex validation on the framework's own state files but lack specific sanitization for the narrative content of external project documents.
Audit Metadata