demo-video
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
setup.shscript executessudo apt-get installto install theffmpegpackage. This requires administrative privileges to modify the system environment during the setup process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes narrator scripts and QA questions that are interpolated into model prompts without sanitization, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Narrator lines from
video/vo/narrator.jsonand user-provided questions for thelisten.mjsscript. - Boundary markers: The prompt in
tts.mjsuses a simple "Read:\n" prefix but lacks robust delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potential commands embedded in the text. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
ffmpegandnode, perform network operations viafetchandWebSockets, and control a browser viaagent-browser. - Sanitization: Input text is not validated or escaped before being included in model system instructions or user queries.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
setup.shdownloads font assets from Google's official GitHub repository (github.com/google/fonts) to provide typography for video captions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Scripts such as
tts.mjs,listen.mjs, andpublish.mjsread the~/.openkbs/projectJWTfile to retrieve authentication tokens for use with the vendor's API and proxy services. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
compose.mjsuses the dynamicimport()statement to load the scene configuration fromvideo/scenes.mjs, which allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code provided in the configuration file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell command execution, including calling
ffmpeg,ffprobe,node, andagent-browserto perform video processing and recording tasks.
Audit Metadata