file-transcribe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses a sensitive authentication token located at
~/.openkbs/projectJWTto authorize requests sent to the vendor's transcription proxy. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses
execFileSyncto run theffmpegandffprobebinaries for converting media files and extracting duration metadata. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
VOCABenvironment variable is interpolated into the transcription prompt without sanitization. While this is intended to provide a list of terms to the model, it could theoretically be used to inject instructions if the environment variable is populated from an untrusted source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio/video content which is subsequently processed by a language model. It attempts to mitigate accidental instruction following by including specific formatting instructions in the
transcriptionPrompt(e.g., "Output only the transcript, nothing else"). - Ingestion points: Media files provided via the
inputPathargument intranscribe.mjs. - Boundary markers: The script includes explicit instructions to the model to only output the transcript and maintain specific formatting, acting as a boundary for the generated text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (
ffmpeg), network communication (fetchto Google and vendor proxy), and file system writing (fs.writeFileSyncfor transcripts). - Sanitization: The input file is converted to a 16 kHz mono MP3 using
ffmpegbefore processing, which serves to normalize the audio stream and remove non-audio metadata.
Audit Metadata