file-transcribe

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses a sensitive authentication token located at ~/.openkbs/projectJWT to authorize requests sent to the vendor's transcription proxy.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses execFileSync to run the ffmpeg and ffprobe binaries for converting media files and extracting duration metadata.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The VOCAB environment variable is interpolated into the transcription prompt without sanitization. While this is intended to provide a list of terms to the model, it could theoretically be used to inject instructions if the environment variable is populated from an untrusted source.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio/video content which is subsequently processed by a language model. It attempts to mitigate accidental instruction following by including specific formatting instructions in the transcriptionPrompt (e.g., "Output only the transcript, nothing else").
  • Ingestion points: Media files provided via the inputPath argument in transcribe.mjs.
  • Boundary markers: The script includes explicit instructions to the model to only output the transcript and maintain specific formatting, acting as a boundary for the generated text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (ffmpeg), network communication (fetch to Google and vendor proxy), and file system writing (fs.writeFileSync for transcripts).
  • Sanitization: The input file is converted to a 16 kHz mono MP3 using ffmpeg before processing, which serves to normalize the audio stream and remove non-audio metadata.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 20, 2026, 06:49 AM