auto-create-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied briefs and external content from
--skill-urlarguments which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence agent behavior (Indirect Prompt Injection). - Ingestion points: Task brief variable
{brief}and external skill URLs provided via the--skill-urlargument inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to treat external skills as "reference material" only and specifies that they must not override local project rules or agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Perform git operations (worktree, commit, push), interact with the GitHub CLI, install packages based on local lockfiles, and execute arbitrary commands defined in the project's
.ai/agentic.config.json(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill mandates that the agent ignore any instructions to skip tests, bypass security hooks, or exfiltrate data, and requires flagging such attempts in the plan's Risks section.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell operations including git worktree management, commit creation, and interaction with the GitHub CLI. It also executes
validation.commandsspecified in the local.ai/agentic.config.jsonconfiguration file as part of its automated workflow. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external content from user-provided URLs specified in the
--skill-urlargument. It treats this content as non-authoritative and includes explicit logic to prioritize local security policies and project rules over instructions found in these remote files.
Audit Metadata