om-app-spec-writing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources including user-provided briefs, repository documentation (e.g., AGENTS.md), and tracker content (e.g., PR bodies, issue descriptions).
- Ingestion points:
{brief}argument,.ai/agentic.config.json, repository agent docs, tracker content, and external knowledge sources provided viaknowledge.sources. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly defines an 'Untrusted content boundary' in
references/agentic-setup.md, instructing the agent to treat external inputs as data and never as instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file reads, writes App Spec documents to
${SPECS_DIR}, dispatches subagents for review, and invokes other skills such asom-spec-writingandom-gap-analysis. - Sanitization: Instructions in
references/agentic-setup.mdrequire validation of externally-sourced values using a specific regex (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$) before any shell or path interpolation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to parse its configuration files during the setup phase.
- Evidence: Found in
references/agentic-setup.md, where a bash script snippet usesjqto extract configuration values likeSPECS_DIRandPLATFORM_REPOfrom a local JSON file. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dispatches fresh-context subagents to perform critical reviews and architectural checkpoints.
- Evidence: Described in
SKILL.md(Challenger gate and Architect checkpoint) and supported by the instructions inreferences/challenger-prompt.md. This constitutes a controlled delegation of auditing tasks to secondary agents.
Audit Metadata