om-auto-continue-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from PR bodies, comments, review threads, and linked issues to reconstruct execution plans during the 'adoption' phase.
- Ingestion points: Data enters context in
references/adopt-pr.mdvialist-issue-comments,get-pr,list-review-comments, andget-issueoperations. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly defines an 'Untrusted content boundary' in
references/agentic-setup.md, instructing the agent to treat repo/tracker content as data rather than instructions and to quote suspected injections rather than following them. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
gitcommands for worktree management and commits, shell commands for validation gates, and tracker operations for PR mutations (SKILL.md,references/worktree-setup.md). - Sanitization: External values (IDs, slugs, branch names) are validated against numeric or alphanumeric regex patterns before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands for repository management, dependency installation, and validation gates.
- Evidence:
references/worktree-setup.mdcontains bash snippets forgit worktreeoperations.SKILL.mdstep 6 executesvalidation.commandsdefined in the repository configuration. - Risk: These are standard operations for a development agent and are gated by project-local configuration.
Audit Metadata