om-auto-create-pr-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from several sources including the
{brief}argument, repository issues, pull request bodies, CI logs, and remote content fetched via the--skill-urlparameter. This constitutes a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The workflow ingest data via the
briefargument, tracker operations (reading issues and PRs), and external skill URLs provided at runtime. - Boundary markers: The skill provides specific instructions in
references/agentic-setup.mdto treat external data strictly as data rather than instructions, specifically warning against following 'ignore previous instructions' or commands embedded in that data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including file system modification (via worktrees), Git operations (commit/push), tracker management (PR creation/labeling), network access (fetching skill URLs), and the ability to spawn subagents.
- Sanitization: The instructions mandate regex validation for identifiers like issue IDs and branch names (
^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$) and require proper quoting of external values during shell or path interpolation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch and process external documentation or configuration via the
--skill-urlrepeatable argument. - Evidence:
references/external-skill-urls.mdoutlines the procedure for fetching these URLs and extracting actionable guidance. - Context: The skill limits the influence of this content by explicitly stating it must not override internal safety rules, project configuration, or security gates.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow utilizes a dispatcher pattern that spawns general-purpose subagents to implement individual steps of an execution plan.
- Evidence:
references/executor-dispatch.mddescribes the sequential spawning of executors using theAgenttool, including logic for model tier selection and result verification. - Control: Subagents are restricted to their specific step, are forbidden from claiming PR locks or posting comments, and cannot spawn further nested subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs various shell operations to manage the development environment and lifecycle of the code changes.
- Evidence:
references/worktree-setup.mdincludes shell commands for creating and removing isolated Git worktrees and installing project dependencies based on detected lockfiles.
Audit Metadata