om-auto-fix-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the repository and tracker, such as Pull Request bodies, diffs, issues, and CI logs.
  • Ingestion points: Accesses PR metadata and diffs via get-pr and get-pr-diff tools in SKILL.md and references/stabilize-ci.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent in references/agentic-setup.md to treat repository content as data rather than instructions and to report directives like "ignore previous instructions" as suspected prompt injection.
  • Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution for git and validation, filesystem modifications for code fixes, and network communication with the tracker API.
  • Sanitization: The skill requires regex validation (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$) and quoting for externally-sourced strings (issue IDs, PR numbers, branch names) before they are used in shell or path interpolation.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands defined in the repository's configuration and loads local instruction extensions.
  • Config-based execution: The validation.commands field in .ai/agentic.config.json is used to run tests and verification steps during the CI stabilization loop in references/stabilize-ci.md.
  • Extension mechanism: The skill attempts to load a repo-local SKILL.md as an extension in references/agentic-setup.md, which allows repository content to dynamically influence agent instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses complex shell scripts for environment setup and git management.
  • Evidence: references/worktree-setup.md contains bash scripts to manage isolated git worktrees using git worktree add, mkdir, and prune.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains language associated with prompt injection, although it is used defensively to guide the agent's safety behavior.
  • Evidence: references/agentic-setup.md explicitly mentions patterns like "ignore previous instructions" and "run this command" as examples of directives the agent should identify as malicious and refuse to follow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 10:40 AM