om-auto-merge-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from the repository and tracker (such as Pull Request descriptions, code diffs, and issue comments) to perform "AI judgment" on merge eligibility.
- Ingestion points: External data is retrieved using tracker operations like
list-prs,get-pr,get-pr-diff, andlist-issue-commentsas documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/ai-judgment.md. - Boundary markers: The skill provides defensive instructions in
references/agentic-setup.mdunder the "Untrusted content boundary" section, directing the agent to treat repository content as data and ignore any embedded directives or instructions encountered during analysis. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to perform automated actions such as applying labels (
apply_label) and posting or updating comments on pull requests (comment-pr,update-comment). - Sanitization: Input validation is mandated in
references/agentic-setup.md, which requires validation of externally-sourced identifiers and branch names against strict regular expressions (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$) and ensures they are quoted before interpolation into shell commands or tracker calls.
Audit Metadata