om-auto-write-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources like issue trackers and feature briefs, creating a surface for potential injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Issue metadata and comments retrieved via
get-issueandsearch-prs(documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/agentic-setup.md). - Boundary markers: Instructions in
references/agentic-setup.mdmandate treating repo/tracker content as data rather than instructions and ignoring any embedded directives. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, create pull requests, post comments, and capture visual evidence via a browser provider.
- Sanitization: External identifiers (issue IDs, slugs, branch names) are validated against the regex
^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$before being used in shell interpolation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes installation commands defined by the target repository's configuration.
- Evidence:
references/worktree-setup.mdinstructs the agent to install dependencies using the repository's lockfile (e.g.,npm install,cargo install). - Risk: This could lead to the execution of malicious code via repository-defined pre-install or post-install hooks.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows instructions to be extended by a file stored within the target repository.
- Evidence:
references/agentic-setup.mddescribes a preflight step to load and apply a repo-localSKILL.mdas an extension. - Risk: A compromised repository could attempt to provide malicious instructions via this file, although the agent is explicitly directed to ignore directives that relax safety rules.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for environment setup and repository management.
- Evidence: Git worktree management and branch creation are performed via shell scripts in
references/worktree-setup.md.
Audit Metadata