om-gap-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data including client transcripts, requirement documents, and repository metadata (PR bodies, issue descriptions, and titles).
- Ingestion points: External materials are read from the
{input}directory during Phase 1, and tracker data is ingested during Phase 2 via operations likelist-prsandget-pr. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a robust "Untrusted content boundary" defined in
references/agentic-setup.md. It explicitly instructs the agent to treat repo, tracker, and client-document content as data, not instructions, and to report suspected injection attempts. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (under
.ai/gap-analysis/and.ai/tmp/), perform git operations (clone, fetch, fast-forward), and execute local shell scripts for verification. - Sanitization: The skill uses regex validation (e.g.,
^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$) for externally sourced values such as repository names, branch names, and project slugs before they are used in shell or path interpolation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a suite of custom bash scripts located in its
bin/directory to perform deterministic validation of the analysis results. - Evidence: The workflow involves running
bin/gap-checklist-gate,bin/gap-orientation-preflight,bin/gap-validate-finding,bin/gap-pipeline-crosscheck, andbin/gap-depth-check. - Security Controls: These scripts are designed with "fail-closed" logic and include protections against command injection. For example,
bin/gap-validate-findingchecks that grounding queries do not start with a hyphen to prevent flag injection and uses--delimiters for search tools likergandgit grep.
Audit Metadata