om-gap-analysis

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data including client transcripts, requirement documents, and repository metadata (PR bodies, issue descriptions, and titles).
  • Ingestion points: External materials are read from the {input} directory during Phase 1, and tracker data is ingested during Phase 2 via operations like list-prs and get-pr.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements a robust "Untrusted content boundary" defined in references/agentic-setup.md. It explicitly instructs the agent to treat repo, tracker, and client-document content as data, not instructions, and to report suspected injection attempts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (under .ai/gap-analysis/ and .ai/tmp/), perform git operations (clone, fetch, fast-forward), and execute local shell scripts for verification.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses regex validation (e.g., ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$) for externally sourced values such as repository names, branch names, and project slugs before they are used in shell or path interpolation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a suite of custom bash scripts located in its bin/ directory to perform deterministic validation of the analysis results.
  • Evidence: The workflow involves running bin/gap-checklist-gate, bin/gap-orientation-preflight, bin/gap-validate-finding, bin/gap-pipeline-crosscheck, and bin/gap-depth-check.
  • Security Controls: These scripts are designed with "fail-closed" logic and include protections against command injection. For example, bin/gap-validate-finding checks that grounding queries do not start with a hyphen to prevent flag injection and uses -- delimiters for search tools like rg and git grep.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 01:12 PM