om-pipeline-retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows for repository-specific extensions via a local file at
.ai/skills/om-pipeline-retro/SKILL.md. Although this is a configuration surface that allows local overrides, the instructions include a strict safety guardrail: the extension is explicitly forbidden from relaxing safety rules, expanding tool/network access, or redirecting outputs, and the agent is instructed to report any such attempts as suspected injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from external sources such as pull request bodies, reviews, and conversation comments.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the tracker using
list-prsandget-properations inSKILL.md(Steps 1 and 2). - Boundary markers: The skill provides a dedicated 'Untrusted content boundary' in
references/agentic-setup.mdinstructing the agent to treat all external content as data, ignore embedded directives, and quote suspicious instructions in the report. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes read-only tracker operations and executes a local shell script
references/classify-runs.sh(Step 4). - Sanitization: Untrusted content is passed to the classification script via JSON on stdin to avoid shell command interpolation. The
classify-runs.shscript itself usesjqto strip quoted lines and fenced code blocks from the text before performing classification logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled shell script,
references/classify-runs.sh, to classify the gathered JSON data. This is a local, deterministic script provided as part of the skill. The instructions include a fallback mechanism to apply the classification rules inline if the execution environment restricts shell commands, ensuring consistent behavior.
Audit Metadata