om-verify-in-repo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources including GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments, as well as repository code and documentation.
  • Ingestion points: Found in SKILL.md workflow steps 1, 2, and 3 which read issue and PR data; and references/agentic-setup.md which describes reading repository and tracker content.
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to treat repo/tracker content as data, never instructions, and to report suspected injections.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to git (read-only) and tracker operations like get-issue and search-prs.
  • Sanitization: Instructions in references/agentic-setup.md command the agent not to comply with embedded directives and to quote them in reports instead.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for repository inspection and configuration handling.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md uses git log and git fetch; references/agentic-setup.md includes a bash snippet using jq to parse .ai/agentic.config.json.
  • Mitigations: Instructions in references/agentic-setup.md require validation of every externally-sourced value against a strict regex (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$) before shell interpolation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches metadata and content from issue trackers and remote git repositories.
  • Evidence: Uses get-issue, search-prs, and git fetch to retrieve information from GitHub or other configured trackers.
  • Context: These operations are central to the skill's purpose and target well-known developer services.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 08:40 AM