om-verify-in-repo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources including GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments, as well as repository code and documentation.
- Ingestion points: Found in
SKILL.mdworkflow steps 1, 2, and 3 which read issue and PR data; andreferences/agentic-setup.mdwhich describes reading repository and tracker content. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to treat repo/tracker content as data, never instructions, and to report suspected injections.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
git(read-only) and tracker operations likeget-issueandsearch-prs. - Sanitization: Instructions in
references/agentic-setup.mdcommand the agent not to comply with embedded directives and to quote them in reports instead. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for repository inspection and configuration handling.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdusesgit logandgit fetch;references/agentic-setup.mdincludes a bash snippet usingjqto parse.ai/agentic.config.json. - Mitigations: Instructions in
references/agentic-setup.mdrequire validation of every externally-sourced value against a strict regex (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$) before shell interpolation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches metadata and content from issue trackers and remote git repositories.
- Evidence: Uses
get-issue,search-prs, andgit fetchto retrieve information from GitHub or other configured trackers. - Context: These operations are central to the skill's purpose and target well-known developer services.
Audit Metadata