openai-docs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Prompt Injection (Safety Bypass): The
references/prompting-guide.mdfile contains prompt templates intended to influence model behavior. These include instructions to suppress 'unsolicited warnings, disclaimers, approval flows, or safety/compliance checklists' to increase autonomy. While these are presented as guidance for specific model tiers, the use of safety-bypass language is a security consideration.- Command Execution and External Downloads: The skill includes scripts likefetch-codex-manual.mjsandresolve-latest-model-infothat execute shell commands and utilizecurlorfetchto retrieve documentation from official OpenAI domains. This behavior is used to maintain an up-to-date documentation cache.- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill represents a potential attack surface as it is built to search, fetch, and process external content from official documentation sites. - Ingestion points: External content enters the context via
official-docs.mdthrough official-domain web search and page fetches. - Boundary markers: The
prompting-guide.mdfile includes instructions regarding precedence ('The user's instructions take precedence over guidelines provided in a skill'), which serve as a rudimentary boundary. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and perform network requests via
fetch-codex-manual.mjsandresolve-latest-model-info. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization logic detailed for the content retrieved from remote documentation pages before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata