analyze
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources (CSV, Excel, JSON files) and processes them using an agent with significant capabilities.
- Ingestion points: External files located in the
input/directory (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Edit,Glob, and executes dynamically generated Python scripts. - Sanitization: Basic data cleaning is performed (e.g., stripping characters from currency), but there is no security-focused sanitization of the actual content to prevent injection attacks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic path resolution by concatenating user-supplied
$ARGUMENTSinto file system paths. The current sanitization method (strip("/")) is insufficient to prevent path traversal attempts using../sequences, which could allow the agent to read or write files outside the intended directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic execution by generating Python scripts at runtime based on the detected data domain. While the templates are defined within the skill, the generated code executes with the agent's full permissions on user-provided data.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generated HTML dashboard includes a reference to the Chart.js library via a CDN. This is a reference to a well-known service and is documented as part of the skill's intended visualization functionality.
Audit Metadata