canva-asset-manager
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides implementation examples where user-controlled input, such as asset names and tags, is directly interpolated into shell commands as arguments (e.g.,
python ... --name "Custom Name"). This creates a surface for command injection if the agent fails to properly escape or sanitize these values before execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to upload assets from external URLs (
upload_from_url.py,batch_url_upload.py). This allows the agent to fetch data from arbitrary network locations and transmit it to Canva, which could be misused for unauthorized data movement or Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from local files and remote URLs, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Media files residing in the
input/directory and content fetched from arbitrary remote URLs. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings for the agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the processed assets.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for shell execution, as well asReadandWritetools for file system interaction. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of content validation, filtering, or escaping of metadata or data extracted from external sources before it is processed.
Audit Metadata