canva-asset-manager

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides implementation examples where user-controlled input, such as asset names and tags, is directly interpolated into shell commands as arguments (e.g., python ... --name "Custom Name"). This creates a surface for command injection if the agent fails to properly escape or sanitize these values before execution.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to upload assets from external URLs (upload_from_url.py, batch_url_upload.py). This allows the agent to fetch data from arbitrary network locations and transmit it to Canva, which could be misused for unauthorized data movement or Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from local files and remote URLs, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Media files residing in the input/ directory and content fetched from arbitrary remote URLs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings for the agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the processed assets.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool for shell execution, as well as Read and Write tools for file system interaction.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of content validation, filtering, or escaping of metadata or data extracted from external sources before it is processed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 20, 2026, 12:43 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — canva-asset-manager