openchoreo-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation indices and configuration manifests from the vendor's official domain (
openchoreo.dev) and GitHub repositories (github.com/openchoreo). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system tools including
kubectl,helm, andgitto manage Kubernetes cluster states, install platform components, and clone source code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process remote data which the agent then follows as instructions, creating a potential attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Documentation pages are retrieved via
scripts/fetch-page.shand repository contents are fetched viagit clonefrom the vendor's GitHub organization. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the fetched remote Markdown content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute
kubectl,helm, and general shell commands, which provide significant control over the target environment. - Sanitization: The skill performs basic validation of version strings and regex-escapes title strings used in searches, but the resulting remote content is treated as a trusted source of instructions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Installation playbooks and specific command sequences are dynamically resolved at runtime from remote vendor resources rather than being statically defined within the skill.
Audit Metadata