task-banner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to modify the global
~/.claude/settings.jsonfile to add aStophook. This hook executes a shell command string every time a task is completed, establishing a persistent mechanism for background command execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installed script
mac-overlay.jsincludes a 'click-to-focus' handler that executes arbitrary shell commands using/bin/bash -lcif thePEON_CLICK_COMMANDenvironment variable is set. This functionality introduces a latent execution vector that can be triggered by a user clicking the notification banner if the execution environment has been compromised (e.g., via a malicious.envfile in a workspace). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a predictable, world-writable file path (
/tmp/claude-banner-msg) to pass task summaries from the agent to the notification hook. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where other local users or malicious processes can write to the file to spoof notifications or inject content into the arguments passed to theosascriptexecution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
mac-overlay.jsscript dynamically generates and executes JXA code for iTerm2 interaction by concatenating thesessionTtyargument directly into a code string. While the default skill configuration does not provide this argument, the script's internal logic is vulnerable to code injection if invoked with untrusted parameters.
Audit Metadata