agent-transcript
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/agent-transcriptexecutes the localcodexbinary viachild_process.spawnto retrieve thread data. This is a legitimate interaction with the host environment to access session history. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to read and process sensitive session logs from local directories such as
~/.codexand~/.claude. It implements significant mitigations to prevent accidental exposure: - A
redactfunction uses regular expressions to mask private keys, API tokens (OpenAI, GitHub, AWS), JWTs, auth headers, emails, and local system paths. - An
unsafecheck prevents the script from returning content if certain sensitive patterns are still detected after redaction. - Instructions mandate user authorization before any transcript is published to an external platform like GitHub.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted session logs which may contain malicious instructions from previous interactions.
- Ingestion points: The
renderandfindcommands read.jsonlfiles from local session directories as seen inscripts/agent-transcript. - Boundary markers: Transcripts are enclosed in
<details>tags and unique HTML comments (<!-- agent-transcript:start -->) as defined inSKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
fsmodule for file operations andchild_processto call local binaries withinscripts/agent-transcript. - Sanitization: Includes multi-layered redaction, byte/line-based truncation to prevent context window flooding, and explicit omission of system prompts and raw tool outputs.
Audit Metadata