landpr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Pull Request content which may contain instructions that could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the landing process.
- Ingestion points: Data from GitHub Pull Requests (titles, descriptions, and comments) for the openclaw/openclaw repository.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the PR content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to perform
rebase,force-push, andmergegit operations. - Sanitization: The provided instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested PR content before it is processed.
Audit Metadata