clawhub-pr-maintainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub PRs and issues to drive maintainer workflows, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PR titles, bodies, and comments are retrieved via
gh pr viewandgh issue view(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat external data as untrusted are present in the skill's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute
ghCLI commands to comment, label, or close PRs, andbunto execute local scripts (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no documented steps for sanitizing external PR content before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to generate and execute local Playwright test scripts based on requirements found in pull requests.
- Evidence: The agent is directed to "Write a temporary Playwright scenario" and execute it using
bun run proof:ui(SKILL.md). - Risk: A malicious contributor could craft a PR description designed to trick the agent into generating and running a script with harmful local side effects.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs standard command-line tools to manage repository state and execute project-specific workflows.
- Evidence: Uses
ghfor GitHub API interactions andbunfor local testing and publishing of proof artifacts (SKILL.md). - Context: These tools are used for maintainer operations within the
openclaw/clawhubrepository.
Audit Metadata