convex-quickstart
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests a user-provided "idea" and "template" which are passed to a recipe to generate a project. This untrusted input influences the generated code and agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
workflowsection inSKILL.mdidentifies the{idea, template}object as primary input for the initialization recipe. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or guardrails to prevent instructions embedded within the user's "idea" from overriding skill logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the local filesystem and execute shell commands via
npxfor verification. - Sanitization: No explicit validation or sanitization of the input strings is described before they are processed by the recipe.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates backend code (Convex schemas and functions) and immediately attempts to execute and verify it as part of its "SELF-VERIFY RULE".
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runnpx tsc --noEmitandnpx convex dev --onceon the newly generated codebase to ensure it compiles and deploys. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage the development lifecycle.
- Evidence: Use of
npx convex devandnpx tscinSKILL.mdto perform local anonymous deployments and type checking. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow depends on fetching external components and tools.
- Evidence: The
quickstart-recipe@^2is fetched and cached by the platform, andnpxis used to invoke external tools (Convex and TypeScript). These represent standard external dependencies for the development environment.
Audit Metadata