notebooklm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README.md file contains multiple links to an external ZIP archive ('notebooklm-skill-v3.4.zip') on the account 'dhhn2002', which differs from the skill's declared owner 'openclaw'. All primary documentation links (Wiki, Issues, Contributing) are deceptive and redirect to this download URL.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script
scripts/run.pyutilizessubprocess.runto execute other Python scripts with agent-provided arguments, enabling a vector for command injection or execution of unverified scripts. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The initialization scripts
scripts/setup_environment.pyandscripts/__init__.pyautomatically download and install external libraries (patchright) and browser binaries (chromium,chrome) from remote sources at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in
SKILL.mduse high-pressure directives ('⚠️ CRITICAL', 'EXTREMELY IMPORTANT') and 'Follow-Up' mechanisms to override the agent's default conversational behavior and safety constraints. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's architecture in
scripts/auth_manager.pycaptures Google session cookies and stores them in a localstate.jsonfile. These credentials are then manually injected into browser sessions, posing a risk of session theft if the local file system is compromised.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata