skills/openclaw/skills/notebooklm/Gen Agent Trust Hub

notebooklm

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README.md file contains multiple links to an external ZIP archive ('notebooklm-skill-v3.4.zip') on the account 'dhhn2002', which differs from the skill's declared owner 'openclaw'. All primary documentation links (Wiki, Issues, Contributing) are deceptive and redirect to this download URL.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script scripts/run.py utilizes subprocess.run to execute other Python scripts with agent-provided arguments, enabling a vector for command injection or execution of unverified scripts.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The initialization scripts scripts/setup_environment.py and scripts/__init__.py automatically download and install external libraries (patchright) and browser binaries (chromium, chrome) from remote sources at runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in SKILL.md use high-pressure directives ('⚠️ CRITICAL', 'EXTREMELY IMPORTANT') and 'Follow-Up' mechanisms to override the agent's default conversational behavior and safety constraints.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's architecture in scripts/auth_manager.py captures Google session cookies and stores them in a local state.json file. These credentials are then manually injected into browser sessions, posing a risk of session theft if the local file system is compromised.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 11:58 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — notebooklm