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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core protocol utilizes the shell 'eval' command to execute logic defined in the 'Verify' and 'Guard' configuration fields. Evidence found in 'references/autonomous-loop-protocol.md' shows the use of 'eval "$VERIFY_CMD"' and 'eval "$GUARD_CMD"' to perform measurements and stability checks during each iteration.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill architecture is designed to execute arbitrary code strings provided in its configuration. The 'references/metric-library.md' documentation provides several examples that utilize potentially dangerous execution methods, including 'node -e', 'python3 -c', and network-capable utilities like 'curl' and 'wrk' for metric collection.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it analyzes external data sources (git logs, diffs, and scoped files) to determine its next optimization steps without proper sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Phases 1 (Review) and 2 (Ideate) in 'references/autonomous-loop-protocol.md' involve reading repository history and file contents matching the user-defined 'Scope'.
- Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to modify the filesystem, perform git operations, and execute arbitrary shell commands via 'eval'.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is performed before it is processed by the agent to generate new code or commands.
Audit Metadata