benchmark-models
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local binary
gstack-model-benchmarklocated in the vendor-specific directory$HOME/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the sensitive file
~/.claude/.credentials.jsonand theANTHROPIC_API_KEYenvironment variable. While this is used to check provider authentication status for the vendor's own tools, it involves direct access to credential storage. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from multiple sources: user-provided inline prompts, external files, and local SKILL.md files.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Mandatory Evidence Chain:\n1. Ingestion points:
AskUserQuestiontool for inline prompts and file path inputs (Steps 1A, 1B, 1C).\n2. Boundary markers: Absent. Prompts are treated as raw strings for command arguments.\n3. Capability inventory: Shell execution capability through theBashtool.\n4. Sanitization: Absent. The instructions do not specify any validation, escaping, or sanitization of user-provided prompt text before it is used in a shell command. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct shell commands via string concatenation of unsanitized user input (e.g.,
"$BIN" --prompt "<text>"). This creates a significant risk for command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like backticks, semicolons, or pipe symbols.
Audit Metadata