codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local scripts and binaries located in
~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/, includinggstack-paths,gstack-config,gstack-codex-probe, andgstack-review-log. These appear to be part of the vendor's internal support framework. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses
evalto execute the output of~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-pathsto resolve runtime environment variables like$PLAN_ROOTand$TMP_ROOT. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Sources shell code from
~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-codex-probeto perform authentication checks and version validation for the Codex CLI. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Recommends the installation of the
@openai/codexglobal NPM package if the binary is missing, providing a link to the official OpenAI GitHub repository. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function involves sending project data (git diffs and the full contents of plan files) to an external service (OpenAI) via the
codexCLI for analysis. This behavior is transparently documented and aligned with the skill's purpose. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from
git diffand plan files. To mitigate this, the skill implements a 'Filesystem Boundary'—explicit instructions to the AI to ignore instructions found in those files—and usesDIFF_START/DIFF_ENDdelimiters to wrap adversarial content. - Ingestion points: Git diffs (Step 2A, 2B) and plan files (Step 2C).
- Boundary markers: Includes
DIFF_START/DIFF_ENDdelimiters and explicit 'filesystem boundary' instructions. - Capability inventory: Uses
Bashfor shell execution and theWritetool to update plan files. - Sanitization: Relies on instructional constraints and delimiters rather than programmatic sanitization.
Audit Metadata