skills/opencue/skills/guard/Gen Agent Trust Hub

guard

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Command injection vulnerability in the setup logic. The skill instructs the agent to insert user-provided text directly into a shell command (cd "<user-provided-path>") without sanitization, allowing for arbitrary code execution if the input contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks or command substitution).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Risky use of eval on script output. The setup process executes eval "$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-paths)", which interprets the output of the local script as shell commands. This is a dangerous pattern if the target script or its environment is not strictly controlled.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of scripts from relative paths. The skill's hooks reference scripts in sibling directories (../careful/ and ../freeze/) via the ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR} environment variable, which relies on a specific and trusted local directory structure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Ingestion of untrusted data into shell capabilities (Indirect Prompt Injection surface):
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied path via the AskUserQuestion tool in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the user input is interpolated directly into a bash command string without delimiters or validation instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Bash tool usage for path resolution and state management.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not require the agent to sanitize or validate the user-provided path before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 05:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — guard